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25 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
# 01 — Institutional Gap Analysis
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Gaps identified in the **as-is** algorithm, derived from the public chronology.
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Each gap is addressed by a specific element of this package and is referenced
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from `resources/mappings.yaml` and the diagrams.
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| ID | Gap (as-is) | Addressed by (to-be) |
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|----|-------------|----------------------|
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| **G1** | No explicit object-classification step — "is it a drone, and how sure are we?" was implicit. | `Decision_ObjectClassification` makes class **and confidence** explicit before any threat call. |
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| **G2** | Public-broadcast authority was a **single point of failure**: one request from NBS Joint Staff was the only trigger, with no timed fallback. | `Task_AuthorizeBroadcast` carries a 3-minute timeout with a proposed escalation to the Crisis Management Centre (KVC). *Not yet institutionally agreed.* |
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| **G3** | Message wording was composed under time pressure. | `Decision_CellBroadcastScope` selects a **pre-approved template** (`MSG_*`); guardrail GR-4 forbids free-text public messaging. |
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| **G4** | No bounded, threat-graded **time target** for dispatch — the 40-minute delay had no SLA to breach. | `Decision_NotificationUrgency` outputs `broadcastSlaSeconds`; see `03-notification-timing-sla.md`. |
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| **G5** | No automatic detection that the SLA had been missed. | Non-interrupting **SLA-breach boundary timer** on `Task_DispatchBroadcast` → `Task_EscalateSla`. |
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| **G6** | Alert footprint was coarse — not matched to the drones' predicted path. | `Decision_CellBroadcastScope` builds the footprint from `corridorMunicipalities`. |
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| **G7** | Interception safety criteria were not written down or inspectable. | `Decision_InterceptionAuthorization` gates engagement on positive hostile ID, over-populated-area and debris-zone-clear, in that priority order. |
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| **G8** | Follow-on civil decisions (school closures, resident enquiries) had no owner. | CMMN stage `Stage_FieldResponse` (`HT_MunicipalEnquiries`); IZM recorded as a consulted party in `02-raci.md`. |
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## Residual / open
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- **G2 escalation authority** is a *proposal*. Whether KVC may authorise a
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public broadcast when NBS Joint Staff is unreachable is an institutional and
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legal question, not a modelling one, and is flagged for review.
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- SLA values in `03-notification-timing-sla.md` are **proposed defaults** for
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validation against NBS/VUGD operational reality.
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