lv-civdef-drone-threat-public-address/docs/01-institutional-gap-analysis.md

01 — Institutional Gap Analysis (AS-IS) and TO-BE Targets

Non-normative supporting document. This is the analytical core of the package: it maps each publicly-reported coordination failure to a specific element of the BPMN / DMN / CMMN models, so the revised algorithm can be designed against a concrete baseline.

Why this package exists

After the 7 May 2026 Rēzekne incident the Ministry of Defence stated publicly that the inter-institutional information / notification algorithms must be reviewed and improved. The problem reported by municipalities and crisis-management officials was not a single mistake but a structural misalignment: no single, shared, machine-checkable description of who decides what, when, and on which inputs. UAPF exists precisely to hold that description as versioned, reviewable artifacts. This package is the AS-IS baseline.

Gap register

#	Reported gap (public record)	Where it lives in the model	TO-BE target
G1	Cell-broadcast reached Rēzekne city only after residents had already seen/heard the drones; ~40-min lag vs Ludza/Balvi.	Task_RequestBroadcast → Task_CellBroadcast	Tighten the trigger so the request is driven by the predicted corridor, not by confirmed overflight. Decision_CellBroadcastScope already takes corridorMunicipalities — make corridor pre-alerting mandatory at threatLevel = elevated.
G2	Single point of failure: the alert fires only on an explicit NBS request. NBS stated the alert was not sent to Rēzekne because the "incident duration was too short"; the Interior Minister stated VUGD was ready but "a clear algorithm was not triggered".	Task_RequestBroadcast (documented GAP)	Define an explicit fallback authority and a time-boxed escalation: if NBS does not issue / decline a request within N minutes of a confirmed corridor, a named role (KVC duty) may trigger. Model as a boundary timer event on Task_RequestBroadcast in v0.2.
G3	Message content too thin — "possible threat" with no nature-of-threat detail; residents phoned municipalities asking whether tanks or drones were coming.	Decision_CellBroadcastScope output messageTemplate	Replace generic text with typed templates (MSG_DRONE_IMMINENT, MSG_DRONE_POSSIBLE, MSG_AIRSPACE_MONITORING) carrying threat type, recommended action and an information URL. Templates are an output column in the DMN table.
G4	No unified action algorithm across institutions; municipalities reported missing communication with state institutions and unclear ownership (AM vs VARAM vs IZM).	Task_NotifyAgencies; resources/mappings.yaml	A single resource mapping with explicit RACI per element (this package), reviewed jointly. Notification to KVC, IeM and municipal commissions modelled as a parallel branch so it cannot be skipped.
G5	Information on number/origin/landing sites of the drones was unavailable for ~5 hours.	CMMN Stage_Investigation (HT_TechExam, HT_OriginAttribution)	Make investigation a first-class case stage with explicit milestones and an information-publishing cadence, not an ad-hoc activity.
G6	~3-day delay before clear public acknowledgement of the drones' (Ukrainian) origin created a perception of concealment.	CMMN HT_OriginAttribution, HT_DisinfoMonitor, HT_Press	Decouple "confirm origin" from "inform public": publish what is known on a fixed cadence; disinformation monitoring runs in parallel from the start.
G7	Interception not attempted; criteria ("all safety criteria") were not transparent or pre-agreed.	Decision_InterceptionAuthorization	Make the safety criteria an explicit, inspectable DMN table (civilian risk, debris fall-zone, positive ID, firing-position readiness, BAP availability) rather than a verbal judgement.
G8	School-closure and resident-guidance decisions lacked timely recommendations from IZM.	Task_LocalResponse (IZM consulted)	Bind IZM as a consulted resource on Task_LocalResponse with a pre-agreed guidance template issued automatically at threatLevel >= elevated.

Modelling stance

• The BPMN / DMN / CMMN in v0.1.0 deliberately model the AS-IS algorithm plus the minimum corrections needed for it to be internally consistent (parallel notification, typed messages, explicit interception table).
• Items requiring a policy decision — notably G2 (fallback trigger authority) — are flagged in docs/02-raci.md and left as open questions for v0.2; they must not be silently encoded by a process author.
• Nothing here is operationally approved. Lifecycle status is draft.

Open questions for the institutional steward

1. G2 — Who is the named fallback authority if NBS does not act within the escalation window, and what is the window length?
2. Should cell-broadcast corridor pre-alerting be automatic at threatLevel = elevated, or remain a human decision?
3. Is the cell-broadcast platform owned operationally by VUGD only, or jointly with VARAM for the early-warning evolution? This changes the Task_CellBroadcast binding.
4. What is the mandated public-information cadence during an active incident (G5/G6)?