lv.civdef.drone-threat-public-address

UAPF Level-4 process package — v0.2.0 (draft) Conformant to UAPF specification v2.2.0 — see docs/04-validation-report.md.

Drone Threat Public Address & Citizen Notification — a process model of the cross-institutional algorithm for detecting a drone threat over Latvian airspace, deciding on and triggering public cell-broadcast notification, coordinating interception, and conducting field response and origin investigation.

Built from the public record of the 7 May 2026 Rēzekne drone incident and the Ministry of Defence commitment to revise the inter-institutional notification algorithms. Not approved for operational use (lifecycle.status: draft).

Layout

lv-civdef-drone-threat-public-address/
├── uapf.yaml                                  # manifest (kind: uapf.package, level 4)
├── bpmn/
│   └── drone-threat-public-address.bpmn       # end-to-end process flow
├── dmn/
│   └── air-threat-decisions.dmn               # 3 decisions: severity / scope / interception
├── cmmn/
│   └── field-response-investigation.cmmn      # field-response & origin-investigation case
├── resources/
│   ├── mappings.yaml                          # 11 targets, 19 bindings
│   └── guardrails.yaml                        # UAPF-IP guardrails policy snapshot
├── metadata/
│   ├── ownership.yaml
│   ├── lifecycle.yaml
│   └── policies.yaml                          # classification / execution / delegation
└── docs/                                      # non-normative supporting analysis
    ├── 00-incident-chronology.md
    ├── 01-institutional-gap-analysis.md
    ├── 02-raci.md
    ├── 03-uapf-ip-integration.md
    └── 04-validation-report.md

Cornerstones

BPMN Process_DroneThreatPublicAddress — detection → threat assessment → gateway → broadcast-scope decision → request → parallel block {cell broadcast | agency notification | interception evaluation} → synchronise → local response → all-clear → field-response case → close.
DMN one DRD, three decisions — Decision_AirThreatSeverity, Decision_CellBroadcastScope, Decision_InterceptionAuthorization.
CMMN Case_DroneIncidentFieldResponse — debris search, fire suppression, scene security, an investigation stage (technical exam, origin attribution, disinformation monitoring), plus discretionary press and after-action review.
Resources 11 targets (NBS surveillance/Joint Staff/air-defence, VUGD duty and cell-broadcast system, State Police, KVC, Ministry of Defence, municipal commissions, an AI threat-assessment agent, an OSINT MCP tool) bound to every process / decision / case element via the v2.2.0 resource-mapping schema.

UAPF-IP & MCP

The manifest declares requires_capabilities, profiles_supported (uapf-ip-orchestrated, uapf-ip-sync-decision), guardrails, and an exposure.mcp block exposing the process and the three decisions as MCP tools. See docs/03-uapf-ip-integration.md.

Validation

python3 ../../validate.py ../.. <path-to-UAPF-specification-repo>

Result: PASS, 0 errors, 0 warnings against UAPF v2.2.0. The reference CLI tools/uapf-cli/uapf.py will wrongly reject this package because it checks for the obsolete .bpmn.xml extension — this is a known upstream bug, documented in docs/04-validation-report.md.

Intended steward

Authored as an external draft (owner: Rihards Gailums). The intended institutional steward on hand-over is the Ministry of Defence (Aizsardzības ministrija) jointly with the Crisis Management Centre (Krīzes vadības centrs).

Sources

Public reporting only — LSM / eng.lsm.lv, Apollo, TV3, Meduza, Defense News, The Globe and Mail, and the Wikipedia article "2026 Ukrainian drone incursions into Baltic states". Dated record in docs/00-incident-chronology.md.

3.9 KiB Raw Blame History