lv-civdef-drone-threat-public-address/docs/05-validation-report.md

05 — Validation Report

Package: lv.civdef.drone-threat-public-address v0.3.0 Date: 2026-05-18 · Tool: validate.py

Result: 19 / 19 checks passed

Structural

• All three cornerstone files (BPMN, DMN, CMMN) are well-formed XML.
• All six YAML files parse.
• uapf.yaml validates against uapf-manifest.schema.json (UAPF v2.2.0).

Model integrity

• BPMN: 26 flow nodes; every sequenceFlow source/target resolves.
• DMN: exactly 6 decisions; every informationRequirement href resolves.
• CMMN: 11 human tasks across 3 stages.

Quality gates added in v0.3.0 (these are the v0.2.0 defects)

• Every DMN decision carries a <description>. v0.2.0 had none.
• No declared-but-unused decision inputs. Every requiredInput of every decision is used as a decision-table input column or in an output expression. This is the check that proves the v0.2.0 interception defect — positiveHostileId declared but never tested — is fixed.
• Every mappings.yaml binding resolves to a real diagram element, and every targetId resolves to a declared target. The resource↔process linkage is now machine-checkable.

What is not validated here

• Semantic correctness of the modelled algorithm — whether these are the right institutions, thresholds and SLAs — is an institutional review question, tracked in 01-institutional-gap-analysis.md.
• DMN completeness/overlap of FIRST-hit tables is not formally verified; each table ends with a catch-all rule so no input is left without an output.
• Diagram interchange (DI) renders cleanly in dmn-js / bpmn-js / cmmn-js; visual review in the target viewer is still recommended.

Reproduce

python3 validate.py    # exits non-zero on any failure