# Non-normative supplementary file. UAPF does not cornerstone guardrails;
# they live under resources/ as a host-readable policy snapshot of the
# normative rules in the AI LV Exchange MCP Node Profile v0.2, Part II.
authority: lv.pppa.scheme-authority
version: "0.1.0"
profile: "AI LV Exchange MCP Node Profile v0.2"

separation_of_powers:
  - "PPPA does NOT attest to legal facts. It relies on Uznemumu registrs and records what it relied on, and the date. The output of admission is a reliance statement, not an attestation (14.2)."
  - "PPPA verifies only what is technically reproducible: domain control and key control. Anyone may re-run either challenge and obtain the same answer (14.2)."
  - "A technical service provider acquires no trust authority by supplying software or infrastructure (14)."
  - "The Conformity Assessor function MUST be separated from the Scheme Authority before the Exchange leaves sandbox status, or before it admits its third participant, whichever is first (14.1)."

circularity:
  - "A participant MUST NOT be the source of the evidence used to admit it (17.2)."
  - "Legal facts MUST come from Uznemumu registrs, never from the applicant's own data or products - including where the applicant is itself a commercial provider of company-register data (17.2)."
  - "This is enforced in dmn/avota-neatkariba.dmn as a precondition, not as a warning. The default rule rejects."

assurance:
  - "AL0 is self-declared and MUST NOT be presented as verified or accredited (6.1, 17)."
  - "AL0 can never be accredited. No credential is issued below AL2."
  - "Assurance level (how thoroughly the participant was verified) and access tier (what the service demands) are different axes and MUST NOT be conflated (6)."

access:
  - "The tier is set by the consequence of relying on the answer, not by the secrecy of the datum. A legally significant verification is never T0 (6.4)."
  - "MCPF L2 is where the challenge endpoint appears. A node serving T1 at L1 has an identity claim and no identity proof (6.3)."
  - "Fail-closed: an unrecognised tier resolves to T3 requirements, not T0."

adverse_decisions:
  - "The grounds in 15.1 are exhaustive. No other ground is valid."
  - "No single individual may withdraw or suspend accreditation. Two distinct authorised PPPA officers are required (15.4)."
  - "Ordinary withdrawal requires 30 days written notice and a cure period (15.2)."
  - "Emergency suspension is narrow: confirmed key compromise or an active security incident affecting federation trust. It MUST be reasoned in writing and reviewed within 5 working days (15.3)."
  - "Appeal goes to a body excluding any person with a commercial interest in the participant's node or in a competing implementation (15.5)."
  - "Every precondition is checked BEFORE any side effect. Where a side effect is unavoidable, it runs fail-closed: the credential is revoked first, so a later failure leaves the participant untrusted rather than trusted."

eu_ai_act:
  classification: "Not an AI system. This package is deterministic governance - rules defined by natural persons, executed without inference. Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 Art. 3(1) and Recital 12."
  scope: "In scope of the MIC regulatory sandbox because it governs admission to the trust and identity plane of the Process-as-Code AI system, which is the declared AI system."
  human_oversight: "Every adverse decision has at least two mandatory human tasks (the two-officer decision, and the appeal). No adverse decision is ever automated."
  logging: "Each decision emits a signed CloudEvent. The onboarding record MUST state which checks PPPA performed, which external sources it used, which claims PPPA makes, and which remain the participant's responsibility (17.1)."