1.9 KiB
00 — Incident Chronology (7 May 2026, Rezekne)
This package is modelled from the public chronology of the drone incident over eastern Latvia on the night of 6–7 May 2026. No classified or operational source was used.
Public-source timeline
| Phase | What happened (public reporting) |
|---|---|
| Detection | Several unmanned aerial vehicles, assessed as originating from Russian territory, entered Latvian airspace near the eastern border. |
| Tracking | NBS surveillance tracked the objects; at least two drones came down on Latvian territory, one near Rezekne. |
| Impact | A drone struck near a fuel-storage facility in the Rezekne area; no casualties were publicly reported. |
| Public notification | The public cell-broadcast early-warning message reached the Rezekne population approximately 40 minutes after the threat was apparent — the central failure this package addresses. |
| Aftermath | The Ministry of Defence publicly committed to revising the inter-institutional notification algorithms so that a public alert is issued without comparable delay. |
Why this is modelled as a UAPF package
The incident is not a technology failure — the cell-broadcast platform worked. It is a process and decision-rights failure: the algorithm that converts "NBS sees a threat" into "VUGD dispatches a public broadcast" was slow and under-specified. That is exactly the class of problem UAPF exists to make explicit, inspectable and improvable: a BPMN process, the DMN decisions inside it, the CMMN follow-up case, and the resource bindings that say who does what.
Scope boundary
In scope: detection → classification → notification decision → broadcast → interception authorisation → field response → origin investigation → after-action.
Out of scope: NBS internal sensor doctrine, NATO BAP internal procedures, and the criminal investigation, which are referenced only as handoffs.